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INTRODUCTION
The National Football League (NFL) is a joint venture,
comprised of thirty-two independently owned and operated
football teams. Other than on-field competition, there is also
extensive off-field competition between the teams. Each team
owns its independent trademarks, creating the potential for
economic competition over the sale of team merchandise.
Since 1963, however, under an agreement with National
Football League Properties (NFLP),1 each NFL team has
given up the rights to trademark its team merchandise and to
compete over the sale of merchandise. Under the collective
agreement, NFLP has been solely responsible for licensing
and marketing the trademarks and logos of each team.
The NFLP arrangement is neither new nor unique to the
professional football industry. Virtually all teams in American
professional sports leagues, such as Major League Baseball,
the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey
League, also designate their trademark and marketing rights
to a central licensor.2
In 2002, however, NFLP broke from the industry norm.
While other central licensors tolerate the existence of multiple
licensees, NFLP signed an exclusive $250 million, ten-year
agreement with Reebok,3 granting this sports apparel giant
the exclusive right to license the NFL logo for use on sports
paraphernalia.4
NFLP renewed its agreement in 2012, granting Nike and
1. National Football League Properties, whose predecessor is the National
Football Trust, is the central merchandising and licensing arm of the NFL.
2. Other central licensing entities include Major League Baseball Properties,
National Basketball League Properties, and National Hockey League Properties.
3. Ken Belson, Nike to Replace Reebok as N.F.L.’s Licensed-Apparel Maker, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/
sports/football/13nike.html?_r=0.
4. Dennis Dillon, NFL Getting Ready to Transition to New Nike Era for Apparel,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (April 2, 2012), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/
writers/dennis_dillon/04/02/nike/index.html.
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New Era an exclusive five-year contract to manufacture NFL
uniforms and headwear. Subsequently, the NFL went on to
ruthlessly police its contracts, adopting policies requiring
every professional athlete to display the “Nike” symbol
prominently before and after every game.5 For example, in
August of 2013, the NFL fined Robert Griffin III, quarterback
for the Washington Redskins, $10,000 for wearing a nonlogoed tee-shirt during football practice.6
The greatest challenge to NFLP’s practice came in 2007,
when American Needle Inc. (ANI), one of the apparel
manufactures precluded from the football licensing business,
alleged that NFLP’s agreement with Reebok violated §1 of the
Sherman Act.7 In the ensuing litigation, both the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, as well as
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals summarily dismissed
ANI’s challenge. With respect to their licensing practices, the
courts held that the NFL and its thirty-two teams are, “in the
jargon of antitrust law, acting as a single entity.”8 Therefore,
there cannot be a “joining of . . . independent sources of
economic power previously pursuing separate interests.”9
Granting certiorari in 2010,10 the United States Supreme
Court reversed and held that the NFL’s licensing activities
constitute concerted action subject to Sherman Act scrutiny.11
The Court then remanded American Needle to the lower
courts, which must now determine whether NFLP’s
agreement to market collectively, combined with the
agreement to designate an exclusive licensee, violates §1 of
the Sherman Act.12
Focusing on this point of contention, this Article will
5. Chris Yuscavage, Robert Griffin III Refused to Wear Nike Before a Game For
the Second Straight Week Yesterday, COMPLEX SPORTS (Sept. 17, 2012),
http://www.complex.com/sports/2012/09/robert-griffin-iii-refused-to-wear-nike-before-agame-for-the-second-straight-week-yesterday.
6. Kareem Copeland, Robert Griffin III Fined $10K by NFL for Postgame Gear,
NFL (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000113955/article/robertgriffin-iii-fined-10k-by-nfl-for-postgame-gear.
7. The Sherman Act states that, “[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce. . .is declared to be
illegal.” Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. §1 (2004).
8. Am. Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 184 (2010).
9. Id. at 196.
10. Id. at 189.
11. Id. at 202.
12. Id.; see infra Part III for a detailed Rule of Reason analysis.
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critically evaluate NFLP’s provisions under the Sherman Act.
The analysis will be divided into three main parts. Part I
analyzes the threshold inquiry of whether there exists market
power in the market for licensing intellectual property of the
NFL. Part II advocates a quick-look inquiry for ruling
NFLP’s provisions anticompetitive. Part III applies the rule
of reason to the NFLP restrictions, noting that the
anticompetitive
harms
substantially
outweigh
any
procompetitive benefits and suggesting less-restrictive
alternatives. Finally, this Article concludes that the current
NFLP provisions pose serious harms and should be rendered
illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act.
I. MARKET POWER
It is imperative that ANI determine the existence of
market power in order to characterize the NFL’s agreement
as a direct violation of the Sherman Act. market power
ordinarily is inferred from the seller’s possession of a
predominant share of the market,13 and has been defined as
“the ability of a single seller to raise price and restrict
output.”14 Market power is a threshold filter, because it
prevents plaintiffs from pursuing a case where the defendant
is unable to cause anticompetitive effects in the relevant
market.15 Only restraints that present a real possibility of
anticompetitive behavior will be subject to rule-of-reason
scrutiny.16
Applying the concept of market power, and in
demonstrating the potential for anticompetitive effects, ANI
must show that NFL teams exercise market power over some
aspect of trademark licensing.17 In support of its claim, ANI
can demonstrate either direct evidence of market power
through increased prices or secondary evidence of market
power through expert findings of a narrow relevant market
13. Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992).
14. U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
15. Tim Hance, Note, Threading American Needle: Defining a Narrow Relevant
Market for Rule of Reason Analysis in Sports Antitrust Cases, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 247, 250 (2011).
16. Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of the Single-Entity Argument for
Sports Leagues, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 835, 840-41 (2009).
17. Market power is defined as “the power to control prices or exclude
competition.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 353 U.S. at 592.
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for NFL licensed apparel.18
A. Direct Evidence of Market Power
In furthering its antitrust suit against the NFL, ANI can
use direct evidence to show market power. Specifically, ANI
can argue that, since the advent of the exclusivity agreement
with Reebok in the early 2000s, NFL sports gear has
increased in price.19 In fact, a 2006 article demonstrates that
the price of NFL headwear increased in the early 2000s.20
The price of NFL clubs’ replica jerseys also increased in price
from 2002 to 2003.21
However, there are drawbacks in using direct evidence of
price increases to demonstrate market power. Relying on
such evidence may conflate collective conduct with
exclusionary conduct.22 While collective conduct is not illegal,
as most sports leagues designate central entities to exploit
collective intellectual property rights, exclusive conduct, in
which the central entity further designates a sole licensee, is
illegal.23 Here, ANI’s argument relies on data combining
NFL’s exclusionary conduct, which began in 2000 with its
concerted conduct, which began in 1963.24 Hence, the price
increase from the early 2000s might not be a direct result of
NFLP’s exclusionary conduct.25 Therefore, the price increase
may not necessarily illustrate a joining of economic interests
in a manner that illegally restrains trade under § 1 of the
Sherman Act.26

18. Marc Edelman, Upon Further Review: Will the NFL’s Trademark Licensing
Practices Survive Full Antitrust Scrutiny? The Remand of American Needle v. Nat’l
Football League, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 204 (2011).
19. Id. at 205.
20. NFL gear increased in price from $19.99 to $30.00. Id.
21. Id.
22. Edelman, supra note 18, at 204; Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An
Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO MASON L. REV. 827, 830 (2009).
23. See Matthew J. Mitten, From Dallas Cap to American Needle and Beyond:
Antitrust Law’s Limited Capacity to Stitch Consumer Harm from Professional Sports
Club Trademark Monopolies, 86 TUL. L. REV. 901, 927 (2012); see also infra Part II,
Section B, Subpart 1.
24. Edelman, supra note 18, at 204.
25. Id.; see infra Part II for a discussion of the distinction between NFLP’s
exclusionary conduct and its concerted conduct.
26. Edelman, supra note 18, at 205.

HE_AMERICAN NEEDLE UPON REMAND.DOCX

48

4/23/2014 10:41 AM

Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law

[Vol. 24

B. Secondary Evidence of Market Power
ANI can also use secondary evidence to illustrate market
power by defining a narrow product market. Reason being,
evidence of competitive effects can be informative regarding
market definition, “just as market definition can be
informative regarding competitive effects.”27 Competitive
effects will be magnified in a narrower market as opposed to a
broader one. Thus, in order to determine the extent of the
harms stemming from NFLP’s restrictions, ANI must
determine the size of the market affected.28
Here, NFLP has restricted the entire market for the
licensing of intellectual property to be used for professional
football paraphernalia. Accordingly, NFLP’s restrictions will
be deemed anticompetitive if there is a narrow product
market suited for professional football merchandise alone.29
If, on the other hand, the market is so broad that NFLP
cannot alter the “interaction of supply and demand,”30 then its
restrictions will not be deemed anticompetitive.
Applying the concept of secondary market power to
successfully argue for a narrow product market, ANI must
show that NFL-licensed paraphernalia constitutes a unique
market and that there are no substitutes available.31 ANI
will succeed if there is a class of consumers who choose to
purchase only NFL merchandise at the expense of all other
entertainment products. As a result of NFLP’s restrictions on
the market for NFL merchandise, significant competitive
harm has been imposed.32
By contrast, to argue for a broad product market, NFLP
must show that there is no unique consumer market for NFL
merchandise.33 NFLP must show that the relevant market is
that of the broader sports or entertainment product market.34
When viewed in this context, the NFLP’s restrictions would
pose little to no competitive harm.
27.
28.

Id.
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, § 2, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES (2010).
29. Hance, supra note 15, at 253.
30. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984).
31. Edelman, supra note 18, at 206.
32. Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 330 (2d Cir.
2008).
33. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 94.
34. Edelman, supra note 18, at 206.
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Determining whether NFL teams compete with one
another or with the broader entertainment market will be
dispositive of the issue of market power.35 If a narrow product
definition can be established, ANI will have established the
requisite market power to succeed in its suit against the NFL.
The following sections will advocate for a narrow product
definition based on an assessment of the relevant parameters
such as practical observations as well as legal precedents
evidencing a narrow product market.
1. Practical Observations
ANI could successfully argue for a narrow product
definition based on the practical observation that sports
teams compete directly with other franchises in their same
league and region. Such observations indicate the existence of
many “die-hard” football fans who root for specific NFL
franchises. Such fans purchase intra-league products of the
NFL rather than products of other sports leagues.36 In turn,
this selective consumer market for NFL merchandise implies
the existence of a narrow product market.
On a regional basis, for example, within the geographic
submarket of New York/Northern New Jersey, a football fan’s
closest substitute to a New York Giants cap would be a New
York Jets cap, rather than a cap from another sports league,
such as a New York Yankees cap.37
Furthermore, in regions with multiple NFL teams, such as
the San Francisco Bay Area, where the San Francisco 49ers
and Oakland Raiders play in close proximity, both teams are
accessible to most fans.38 Football fans would likely view
49ers and Raiders products as perfect substitutes, choosing
one team over the other. Therefore, the 49ers and the Raiders
would most likely compete for retail space in the San
Francisco area.39
Finally, in regions where no local NFL teams exist, the
range for competing NFL merchandise is even broader. On a
national scale, NFL teams compete in a single product market
35. Hance, supra note 15, at 256.
36. Edelman, supra note 18, at 207.
37. Id. at 208.
38. Id.
39. Also, the Jacksonville Jaguars and Tampa Bay Buccaneers are two franchises
within a 140-mile radius of one another. Id.
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limited to the teams’ individual logos.40 This competition is
based upon the teams’ on-the-field performance, logo, and
color scheme.41 The Dallas Cowboys, with their winning
tradition, frequently compete nationally with other
championship teams such as the Bears, Packers, Steelers, and
Raiders for fans and merchandise sales.42
2. Precedent Challenges
While courts have not evaluated whether NFL sports
merchandise constitutes a narrow product market, challenges
have been brought and could serve as a useful basis for ANI’s
antitrust lawsuit.43 Indeed, plaintiffs have succeeded in
arguing for unique, niche product markets catering to fans of
specific sports.44
Ultimately, ANI should look towards
complaints that were filed by Jerry Jones of the Dallas
Cowboys and George Steinbrenner of the New York Yankees
as guidance in pursuing an antitrust lawsuit against the
NFL.
In 1996, in Dallas Cowboys v. National Football League
Trust,45 Dallas Cowboys Owner Jerry Jones brought an
antitrust suit against NFLP.46 Jones argued for a narrow
product market – that the trademarking rights for NFL
merchandise “have no close substitutes and are not
reasonably interchangeable in use with any other products or
rights . . . .”47 In the absence of NFLP, NFL member clubs
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 209.
Id.
Denise Gellene, It’s Getting Easier Being Green . . . for Merchandisers, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1997 (noting how Green Bay Packers merchandise sales increased
dramatically as a result of the team’s Superbowl appearance, strong history, and rich
tradition); c.f. Jeff Duncan, Delhomme Gambling on Starting Job: QB Left Saints, Home
on a Mission to Find More Playing Time with Panthers, NEW ORLEANS TIMES
PICAYUNE, Jul. 20, 2003, at 3 (noting how Cowboys merchandise previously comprised
of 30% of the NFL apparel market).
43. See e.g. Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and Declaratory
Relief, Dallas Cowboys v. Nat’l Football League Trust, No. 95 Civ. 9426 (2d Cir. 1996),
1996 WL 34473933.
44. See e.g. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y. v. U.S., 358 U.S. 242 (1959); NCAA v. Bd. of
Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
45. Amended Complaint, supra note 43, at ¶ 33.
46. Jones’ antitrust Complaint alleged that NFLP prevented the individual NFL
teams from independently exploiting their own trademarks. However, the Dallas
Cowboys case settled before trial and before the issue of market power was could be
directly addressed by the court. Id.
47. Id. at ¶ 26.
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would compete with one another in the professional football
merchandise market.48
Similarly, in 1997, George Steinbrenner sued MLBP to
gain more control over the Yankees’ intellectual property. 49
Like Jones, Steinbrenner alleged the existence of a narrow
market reserved exclusively for the licensing of professional
baseball products.50 MLBP’s restraint prevented each Club
from competing with one another in the market for baseball
licensing.51 Without MLBP, the Yankees could market its
own popular and distinctive “NY” brand and negotiate
independent contracts with licensees.52
However, both Jones’s and Steinbrenner’s cases settled
before the issue of market power was reached.53 Thus, the
Court did not make a determination as to whether Jones’s or
Steinbrenner’s market characterizations were accurate. By
contrast, the Supreme Court did reach the market power
issue in International Boxing Club of New York v. U.S.54
Here, the Supreme Court drew a definitive distinction
between championship-boxing matches and regular boxing
matches.55 By comparing and contrasting revenues generated
and consumer and supplier demand for championship versus
regular boxing matches, the Court found that championshipboxing is uniquely attractive to fans and constitutes a
“separate, identifiable market.”56 International Boxing Club
therefore shows that courts will draw distinctions in market
power, and thereby find separate identifiable markets, where
there are different levels of demand for products in that
market.
Likewise, in NCAA v. Board of Regents,57 the Supreme
Court drew another distinction as to the factual
48. Hance, supra note 15, at 273.
49. See Complaint Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief, N.Y. Yankees v.
Major League Baseball Enter., No. 97-1153-civ-T-25B (M.D. Fla. 1997), available at
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/FAQ/plaintiff/COMPLAINT.htm.
50. Id. at ¶ 62.
51. Id.
52. Id. ¶¶ 29, 63.
53. See Hance, supra note 15, at 273.
54. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y. v. U.S., 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
55. The Court disagreed with the argument that “any boxing contest, whether
championship or not, always includes one ring, two boxers and one referee, fighting
under the same rules . . . . “ Id. at 251.
56. Id. at 250.
57. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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circumstances illustrating the existence of market power.
The Supreme Court found that the broadcast market for
college football is unique and differs from the market for other
entertainment products. The Court held that there are no
other products that are reasonably interchangeable with
college football.58 The NCAA’s complete control over college
football broadcasts supports the conclusion that the NCAA
possesses market power with respect to those broadcasts. 59
The fact that advertisers would be willing to pay a premium
price per viewer for fans of college football “is vivid evidence of
the uniqueness of this product.”60
In dicta, the Supreme Court compared the attributes of
college football to professional football, concluding that
professional football in the NFL also caters to a unique
demographic.61 While many attributes of college football are
most similar to, and substitutable with those of professional
football, the NFL does not broadcast on Saturdays in
competition with college football.62 Instead, NFL viewers
typically watch on Sundays (whereas college football viewers
watch on Saturdays) and advertisers have paid premium
prices to capture audiences of both college and professional
football.63 As noted, these distinctions would support ANI’s
argument for a distinct product market for professional
football.
3. Market Power Definition in the Context of Professional
Baseball
Similar to the professional football context, there has been
extensive analysis over the market power for professional
baseball products. However, courts have failed to reach a
definitive opinion on the proper product market definition for
the sport of professional baseball. Ironically, rather than hurt
ANI’s arguments, the cases deficiencies and their attendant
criticisms support ANI’s argument for a unique market for
professional football products.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 111.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 111 n. 47.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1293 (1961).
Hance, supra note 15, at 265.
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Major League Baseball Properties v. Salvino,64 a Second
Circuit decision, is a rare instance where a court has reached
a decision on the market for sports licensing. However, the
court’s decision is problematic in light of an evidentiary
imbalance. Whereas the defendant, MLBP, chiefly relied on
market definition to advance its litigation strategy,
orchestrating numerous empirical studies to support a broad
market definition,65 the plaintiff, Salvino, failed to present
sufficient evidence contesting the relevant market. Here,
Salvino unsuccessfully argued for the application of a quicklook analysis, asserting that MLBP’s anticompetitive effects
clearly overshadowed the need for a detailed assessment
illustrating market power.66 The following section will discuss
the Salvino case and the strengths and weaknesses in
asserting an anti-trust claim under a quick look analysis.
a. Quick Look Analysis v. Rule of Reason for
Establishing a Narrow Market
In Salvino, MLBP did not grant Salvino permission to use
its trademarks, preventing it from manufacturing and selling
a line of MLB branded “Bammers” plush toys.67 In response,
Salvino challenged the legality of the baseball clubs’
agreement to collectively designate MLBP as the exclusive
licensing agent of the MLB clubs.68 Salvino claimed that the
collective agreement to designate a central licensor was so
anticompetitive that it should be deemed per se illegal under
the Sherman Act69 or illegal under a quick look analysis.70
Under a quick look analysis, the plaintiff’s prima facie
burden of proving market power is replaced with a
presumption of competitive harm from the very nature of the
challenged conduct.71 Thus, the quick look analysis relieves
64. Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino, Inc. 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008).
65. Id. at 301.
66. Id. at 307.
67. MLBP sent Salvino a “cease and desist letter” after learning that Salvino sold
Bammers to the Arizona Diamondbacks baseball club with the Diamondbacks logo on
them. Id. at 295.
68. Id.
69. The District Court rejected the per se approach; noting the existence of procompetitive benefits as mentioned in BMI. Procompetitive efficiencies include
integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement. See id. at 306-07.
70. See infra Section III.
71. The Truncated or Quick Look Rule of Reason, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
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the plaintiff from having to prove the relevant market and the
defendant’s market power.72 By contrast, under the rule of
reason, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that the
challenged conduct has “an actual adverse effect on
competition as a whole in the relevant market.”73 Therefore,
characterizing the relevant market is “an indispensable
ingredient,”74 to finding a violation under the Sherman Act.75
Evaluating Salvino, the United States District Court of
the Southern District of New York dismissed Salvino’s
arguments, because the anticompetitive effects of MLBP’s
agreement were not obvious.76 Rather than a per se or quick
look analysis, the court held that MLBP’s restrictions should
instead be subject to a rule of reason inquiry.77 Under a rule
of reason inquiry, the plaintiff must establish that the
defendant possesses, “the requisite market power” and thus
the capacity to inhibit competition market-wide.78
With respect to market power, MLBP asserted what
Salvino criticized as the “self-serving view,”79 that the
relevant market is the broader entertainment market. With
the help of its chief economic advisor, Franklin M. Fisher,
MLBP conducted extensive market research studies that
supported a broad definition of the relevant product market. 80
Relying on MLBP’s studies, the district court ruled in favor of
MLBP and held that “Salvino ha[d] failed to offer any
evidence of MLBP’s actual adverse effect on the market or its
sufficient market power.”81
On appeal to the Second Circuit, Salvino again pressed its
available at http://web.archive.org/web/20100604091202/http://www.ftc.gov/opp/
jointvent/3Persepap.shtm (accessed by searching for Federal Trade Commission in the
Internet Archive index).
72. Id.
73. Major League Baseball, Inc. v. Salvino Inc., 420 F.Supp.2d 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y.
2005)(quoting Capital Imaging Assocs. P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc. 996
F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993)).
74. Chicago Prof’l Sports v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th Cir.
1996).
75. Hance, supra note 15, at 283.
76. “[A] casual observer could not summarily conclude that MLBP’s arrangement
has an anticompetitive effect on customers.” Salvino, F.Supp.2d at 220.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 221 (quoting K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d
123, 129 (2d Cir. 1995).
79. Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino, Inc. 542 F.3d 290, 298 (2d Cir. 2008).
80. Hance supra note 15, at 276.
81. Salvino, 420 F.Supp.2d at 221.
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argument that the court should find the collectivity
agreements illegal per se or illegal under a “quick-look”
analysis.82 Salvino argued that, under the quick look analysis,
the rule of reason can be applied in the “twinkling of an eye,”83
because the anticompetitive harms of MLBP’s restraints are
so “intuitively obvious,”84 that a demonstration of market
power is unnecessary.85
Thus, Salvino “dismisse[d] as
immaterial MLBP’s attempts to define the relevant
market . . . .”86 Salvino argued that the existence of a naked
restraint on output and price should excuse it from having to
prove market power and shifts the burden to MLBP to prove
that the restraint has some competitive justification.87
Because Salvino contended the proper test was a per se or
quick-look analysis,88 it did not go to the length and expense
of preparing a detailed analysis of the relevant market as is
needed under the rule of reason test.89 Nevertheless, during
the discovery phase of trial, Salvino’s chief economic expert,
Louis A. Guth, prepared a report claiming that there are no
close substitutes to the intellectual property rights of MLBP. 90
Guth asserted that a “discrete choice” survey would
demonstrate that consumers’ product preferences would not
change with either increases in price of MLBP licensed
products or decreases in price of other branded products.91
By contrast, Fisher provided evidence (Fisher Report) that
prospective licensees of MLBP “displayed interest in using
intellectual property of inter alia, other sports entities and
leagues.”92 Among these examples, Fisher cited: Coca-Cola
choosing NFL intellectual property over MLB intellectual
property for its nationwide promotional campaign; Salvino
itself selling Bammers bearing the intellectual property of a
82. Salvino, 542 F.3d at 294.
83. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.39 (1984).
84. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999).
85. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
86. Salvino, 542 F.3d at 308.
87. See Memorandum in Opposition to MLBP Motion for Summary Judgment at 8
n. 3, Salvino 542 F.3d 290 (No. 06-1867-cv); Salvino Response to MLBP 56.1 Statement
at ¶¶ 60-61, Salvino, 542 F.3d 290 (No. 06-1867-cv).
88. Salvino, 542 F.3d at 309; see infra Part II for a discussion of the quick-look
analysis, holding that demonstrating market power is unnecessary in this context.
89. Hance, supra note 15, at 275.
90. Salvino, 542 F.3d at 301 (quoting Expert Report of Louis A. Guth).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 330 (quoting Expert Report of Franklin M. Fisher).
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wide variety of sports leagues and figures, such as the NFL,
the NBA, and the NHL; and a MLBP-conducted market
research study, which found that major competitors for
intellectual property licensing included apparel manufactures
like Nike, other sports entities like the NBA, and
entertainment companies such as Warner Brothers and
Disney.93
Notwithstanding the imbalance in the parties’ cases, in the
subsequent Second Circuit decision, the majority stressed the
weakness in Salvino’s expert report. The court criticized the
Guth Report as “entirely conclusory . . . neither accompanied
by any evidentiary citation nor followed by any
elaboration . . . [in contrast to the] Fisher Report.”94 Given
the quality of the Fisher Report, the court sided with MLBP
and concluded that the MLB teams competed with the
broader entertainment market in licensing its intellectual
property.95
Evidently, MLBP went to great lengths to prepare the
Fisher Report, because its primary contention was that there
should be a rule of reason inquiry. By contrast, Salvino did
not fully contest the issue of the relevant market, because its
primary contention was that a per se analysis should apply.
In response to MLBP’s deposition on the relevant product
market, Guth even admitted, “I really don’t [have an
opinion] . . . I’m going to leave that to an empirical analysis.”96
In Attorney Tim Hance’s article advocating a narrow
product market for ANI, he has similarly argued that the
Salvino court’s analysis suffers from deficiencies.97 Hance has
noted that Salvino “did not show how the MLBP’s activities
were anticompetitive as a whole when analyzed under the
rule of reason test.”98 Therefore, “the court had no choice but
to accept the MLBP’s evidence of market power because it
was the only evidence submitted.”99
93. Hance, supra note 15, at 276. However, Hance notes that Fisher focused his
survey on the licensees of MLB merchandise, rather than on the fans and consumers of
products containing the MLB logo. Compared to fans, these licensees have a greater
variety of options for substituting MLB-logoed apparel. Id.
94. Salvino, 542 F.3d at 311.
95. Id. at 333-34.
96. Hance, supra note 15, at 276-77 (quoting Guth’s deposition).
97. See id.
98. Id.at 275-76.
99. Id.at 277.
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Indeed, “general characterizations of the NFL’s relevant
market will not suffice, just as Salvino’s general
characterizations of the MLB’s relevant market did not hold
up in Salvino.”100 Given the increasing importance of
intellectual property sales in sports, relevant market and
empirical studies are needed for a rule of reason analysis. 101
Rather than a superficial analysis, conducting detailed
econometric studies will greatly benefit future cases analyzed
under the rule of reason.102
In summary, there is no direct precedent that supports a
narrow definition of the product market for NFL branded
merchandise.
However, support may be gathered by
observing a consumer audience unique to professional
football, analyzing the holding of International Boxing and
NCAA, and supplementing missing empirical data.
II. QUICK-LOOK ANALYSIS IN DETAIL
As evidenced, there is still ambiguity as to whether
market power exists in the market for football licensing.103
Notwithstanding this defect, ANI can push the courts to
conduct the abbreviated “quick look” analysis using either of
two tests. First, courts will apply the quick look analysis
when the anticompetitive effects are so intuitively obvious
that the plaintiff need only present a simplified market
analysis.104 Anticompetitive effects are so intuitively obvious
when there exists such a restraint that, “no elaborate
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the
anticompetitive character of . . . [the defendant’s]
agreement.”105 Second, courts will apply a quick-look analysis
when a particular restraint “is not reasonably necessary to
achieve any of the efficiency-enhancing benefits” claimed and
merely serves as a “naked restraint against competition.”106
The Supreme Court case, National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Board of Regents, is a clear demonstration of
how both quick look tests can be applied.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 284.
Id. at 284-85.
Hance, supra note 15, at 284.
See supra Part I.
See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
Id.
Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino, Inc. 542 F.3d 290, 338 (2d Cir. 2008).
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A. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents,
Applying the Quick Look Analysis Test
In asserting the quick-look analysis against NFLP, ANI
can look to the landmark case of NCAA v. Board of Regents.107
This case centered on the NCAA’s plan for televising college
football games.108 Under the plan, the NCAA made
agreements with the American Broadcasting Company (ABC)
and the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) for rights to
telecast live college football games.109 The plan forbade
member institutions of the NCAA from making any sale of
television rights except in accordance with the NCAA’s
agreements with ABC and CBS.110 Under the plan, no
member institution could appear on television more than six
times. Additionally member schools would be prohibited from
appearing in more than four national broadcasts. 111 Moreover,
prices were subject to a NCAA recommended fee, even though
networks could negotiate with member schools for the right to
televise games.112
In the ensuing litigation, member institutions brought suit
against the NCAA under the Sherman Act, asserting that the
NCAA’s broadcast restrictions violated antitrust laws.113 The
plaintiffs contended that the NCAA had “unreasonably
restrained trade in the televising of college football games.”114
Both the District Court of the Western District of Oklahoma
as well as the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found
that the NCAA’s plan violated §1 of the Sherman Act and
constituted “illegal per se price fixing.”115
The Supreme Court ultimately held that the NCAA plan
prevented member institutions from competing against one
another on the basis of price or otherwise.116 The Court found
that the restrictions were a horizontal restraint among
competitors that placed an artificial ceiling on available
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
1983).
116.

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
Id. at 91-92.
Id. at 92.
See id. at 92-93.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 93.
NCAA, 468 U.S. at 95.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 97 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir.
Id.at 106-07.
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output.117 The restrictions also increased the price that
networks paid to broadcast games. Finally, the restrictions
were inconsistent with the “fundamental goal of antitrust
law,”118 as ultimate consumer demand had little bearing when
setting price and output of the broadcasts.119
Despite noting that horizontal restraints similar to the one
used by the NCAA are “presumed unreasonable,”120 the Court
stated that it would be inappropriate to apply a per se rule in
the context of league sports, where restraints are necessary
for the product to be available at all.121 Instead, there is a
need to determine whether the NCAA’s restraint is merely
ancillary to a legitimate purpose, or a naked restraint on
competition.122 Here, the apparent anticompetitive behavior of
the NCAA created a heavy burden for the NCAA to prove that
its restriction was not a classic restraint on price and
output.123
The NCAA justified its position by establishing a need to
prevent “the adverse effects of live television upon football
game attendance.”124 However, the Supreme Court rejected
the NCAA’s argument as “inconsistent with the basic policy of
the Sherman Act.”125 In essence, NCAA argued that live
college games should be insulated from the full spectrum of
competition because the product is not sufficiently attractive
to consumers.126 This argument is inconsistent with basic
economic policies underpinning a free market;127 advancing
the proposition that “competition itself is unreasonable.”128
Rejecting each of the NCAA’s other pre-textual
justifications,129 the Supreme Court went on to hold that the
NCAA’s exclusive sale of football television rights is a non117. Id.at 117.
118. Id. at 107.
119. NCAA. 468 U.S. at 107.
120. Id. at 100.
121. Id. at 101.
122. See id. at 109-110 (stating that “naked restraint[s] on price and output
requires some competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed market
analysis.”).
123. Id. at 113.; Hance, supra note 15, at 265.
124. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 91 n.6.
125. Id. at 117.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
129. See id. at 114-20.
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ancillary, naked restraint that reduced output and increased
prices, to the detriment of consumers.130
B. Under the Quick-Look Analysis in NCAA, NFLP Violates
§ 1 of the Sherman Act
Similar to the Court’s holding in NCAA, the NFL teams’
collective grant of exclusive rights to a single licensee, defined
as, “exclusive product category licenses,”131 should be struck
down under a quick-look inquiry. In conducting the analysis,
this section will first discuss “collective exclusive trademark
licensing” and how such licensing agreements have survived
quick look analysis scrutiny. Specifically this section will
discuss the Salvino case and its analysis of MPBP’s use of
collective exclusive trademark licensing agreements. Next,
this section will discuss “collective exclusive product category
licensing.” Specifically, this section will discuss the NFLP’s
use of collective exclusive product category licensing and how
such agreements pose significant risk of anticompetitive
harms. Ultimately, this section concludes that the NFLP’s
use of collective exclusive product category licensing violates §
1 of the Sherman Act under a quick look analysis.
1. Collective Exclusive Trademark Licensing
MLBP follows the practice of collective exclusive
trademark licensing. Similar to NFL teams, individual MLB
clubs agree to pool their intellectual property rights, with
each club relinquishing the right to market its own
intellectual property.132 As the clubs’ exclusive licensing
agent, MLBP then licenses the intellectual property for all of
the MLB teams to multiple competing licensees.133 Under its
arrangement, MLBP also charges a “standard royalty
percentage” license for products bearing a MLB club’s
trademark, regardless of variations in a club’s popularity
among consumers, and regardless of the amount of revenues
generated by the licensing of a club’s individual intellectual
property.134 Each club then receives an equal, pro rata share
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Mitten, supra note 23, at 904.
Id. at 902.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 920.
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of profits from licensing royalties.135
In Salvino, the plaintiff challenged MLBP’s collective
licensing arrangement and argued that it should be deemed
illegal under a quick look analysis. The plaintiff argued that
the arrangement is a naked restraint on both price and
output,136 and that the exclusivity and profit sharing
provisions of the MLBP agreement serve no purpose but to
stifle competition.137
As discussed supra,138 a majority of the Second Circuit
found no evidence of “an actual adverse effect on competition
as a whole in the relevant market . . .”139 (thereby rejecting
Salvino’s contention that the MLBP’s provisions should be
struck down under a quick look analysis).140 The court began
by “examining the nature of Salvino’s contentions as to
‘output’ and ‘price,’”141 and determined that MLBP’s
arrangements “might plausibly be thought to have a net
procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on
competition.”142 Therefore, more than a “quick look” is
required.143
With respect to output, the court found no evidence to
support Salvino’s contentions. The clubs’ decision to make
MLBP their exclusive licensor did not “necessarily reduce the
number of licenses issued,” rather, “it merely alter[ed] the
identity of the licenses’ issuer.”144 In fact, the record showed
an increase, rather than a decrease, in the licensing of the
clubs’ trademarks.145
135. Id.at 921.
136. See supra Part I, Section B, Subpart 1.
137. Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino, Inc. 542 F.3d 290, 338 (2d Cir. 2008)
(As Salvino explains, “Without the exclusivity requirement, potential licensees would
have the freedom to either seek out each team for individualized arrangements or deal
with all teams through the centralized agency of MLBP.”).
138. See supra Part I, Section B, Subpart 3.
139. Salvino, 542 F.3d at 341 (quoting Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs
Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 506-07 (2d Cir. 2004).
140. See generally Salvino, 542 F.3d at 319.
141. Id.
142. Id. (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 318.
145. According to the court, the record showed that:
When MLBP became the Clubs’ exclusive licensor in 1987, there were
approximately 100 licensees. . .thereafter, the number of licensees more than
doubled. And in the years since, the number has continued to grow, with
MLBP having, at the time of its summary judgment motion in this case, more
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With respect to price, the majority rejected Salvino’s
contention that the standard licensing fee agreement for the
Clubs’ trademarks and the pro rata sharing of profits
constitutes illegal price fixing.146 MLB’s revenue sharing
agreement is not, in fact, an agreement on price. 147 Indeed,
there has been no horizontal agreement to fix the prices of be
charged to licensees.148 Rather, profit sharing only fixes the
compensation
scheme
for
individual
clubs.149
As
interdependent
entities,
the
professional
baseball
entertainment product is actually enhanced and protected by
fostering a competitive balance among the clubs.150 Profit
sharing is thus a legitimate means of maintaining a measure
of competitive balance.151
In concurrence, then-Judge Sotomayor agreed that Salvino
fails to fit within the purview of the per se analysis; arriving
at her conclusion “using a different framework” from the
majority.152 Sotomayor held that MLBP’s restrictions are
ancillary to a legitimate purpose and are reasonably
necessary
to
achieve
MLBP’s
efficiency-enhancing
objectives.153 In particular, collective trademark licensing
lowers transaction and trademark enforcement costs and
offers one-stop shopping for licensees.154 The provisions also
eliminate negative externalities that may otherwise distort

than 300 licenses outstanding for some 4,000 products in the United States,
along with licenses to some 170 licensees for sales of products outside of the
United States.
Id. at 319.
146. Salvino alleged that since the income from the exploitation of each team’s
intellectual property was equally shared among each member team, this was nothing
but a horizontal price fixing scheme by individual competitors. Salvino, 542 F.3d at
320.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor disagreed, stating that the elimination
of price competition between the clubs for IP licensing “is the essence of price fixing.”
An agreement between competitors that has the purpose and effect of fixing, stabilizing,
or raising prices results in the same. Were the Majority correct, “competing companies
could evade the antitrust laws simply by creating a ‘joint venture’ to serve as the
exclusive seller of their competing products. . .” Id. at 335.
150. This competitive balance is essential to both the viability of the clubs and
public interest in the sport. Id.
151. Id. at 331-32.
152. Salvino, 542 F.3d at 334-41.
153. Id.
154. Mitten, supra note 23, at 926.
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the incentives of MLBP and limit potential efficiency gains. 155
Accordingly, collective exclusive trademark licensing not only
fails to generate substantial anticompetitive effects, but also
fosters redeeming procompetitive benefits.
2. Collective Exclusive Product Category Licensing and the
NFLP
The anticompetitive harms created by NFLP’s restrictions,
classified as “collective exclusive product category licensing,”
have far greater anticompetitive effects, than the collective
exclusive trademark licensing agreements that were used by
MLBP.156 In pushing for a quick-look analysis, ANI must
stress the differences between NFLP’s provisions and MLBP’s
provisions. This is because NFLP not only collectively
markets the teams’ intellectual property, but it also
designates an exclusive licensee for such purposes. 157 The
agreement to grant exclusive licensee rights, in tandem with
the agreement to license collectively, significantly reduces
competition in the market for licensing NFL-branded
apparel.158
Collective exclusive product category limitations, although
found only in the context of professional football, are neither
new nor unique to the context of football apparel as reflected
in American Needle. NFLP created the exclusivity agreement
in the face of a decline in the retail value of its various
trademarked merchandise.159 In an effort to increase
trademark-licensing revenues, NFLP entered into multiple
licensing agreements which granted exclusive product
categories for the licensee.160 By eliminating competing
licensees, exclusive product category licensing allows
designated licensees to obtain “a premium price through a
large advance, high minimum guarantees, and potentially a
155. An example would be the so-called free-rider problem, whereby another Club
might benefit disproportionately from the actions of MLBP in licensing the MLB brand,
decreasing incentives for the MLBP to develop the intellectual property of MLB.
Salvino, 542 F.3d at 340. For a more comprehensive discussion, see infra Section III.
156. Mitten, supra note 23, at 927.
157. Id. at 927-28.
158. Id.
159. From 1996 to 2010, the aggregate value of NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLB
trademarked merchandise declined from approximately $8.8 billion to $7.83 billion.
Meredith Ashley, Sports Licensing: 2010 Year-in-Review, LICENSING J. at 2 (Jan. 2011).
160. Id.
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higher royalty rate.”161
Here, NFLP has signed a ten-year exclusivity agreement
with Reebok (now Nike and New Era) to license NFL apparel
and headwear.162 As a result, these licensees have become the
exclusive provider of apparel and headwear of the NFL.163
This arrangement necessarily implies that all other
competing licensees, including ANI, are denied the
opportunity to license the intellectual property of the NFL.
These collective exclusive product category limitations
have clear anticompetitive harms. From the outset, the
restrictions can be viewed as a collective agreement among
league clubs, precluding economic competition in the licensee
market.164 As Professor Matthew Mitten has stated,
“[p]rospective licensees have no alternative means of
obtaining authorization to use league clubs’ trademarks[.]” 165
In effect, the agreement has eliminated competing
manufacturers from the wholesale market for the distribution
and sale of apparel and headwear products of the NFL.166 As a
result, the supply of retail products has been reduced, leading
to fewer consumer choices available for retail products
bearing the trademarks of NFL clubs, with the few available
sold at higher retail prices.167
Another example of exclusive product category licensing
behavior is the NFL’s exclusive interactive video game
licensing agreement with Electronic Arts.168 In Pecover v.
Electronic Arts, a pending antitrust case,169 plaintiffs who
purchased the Madden NFL game series brought an antitrust
class action against Electronic Arts (EA), alleging that EA
foreclosed competition in the market for interactive football
software.
Plaintiffs argued that as a result of the exclusivity
agreement, sports gamers were limited to a single choice
among game manufacturers, with only the NFL and EA

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Mitten, supra note 23, at 927.
Id. at 928.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mitten, supra note 23, at 929.
Pecover v. Electronic Arts, 633 F.Supp.2d 976 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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reaping the rewards.170 Prior to the agreement, EA charged
$29.95 for Madden NFL in a competitive market.171 After the
exclusivity agreement, other companies stopped making the
software, such as Take Two Interactive, who withdrew its
NFL 2K5, a popular and less expensive NFL video game. 172
Competing game manufacturers were not able to re-enter the
market with non-NFL branded interactive football software.173
Immediately afterwards, EA increased its price for Madden
NFL “nearly seventy percent to $49.95,”174 with EA now
selling its interactive football software for up to $59.95.175
In the ensuing litigation, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California, notwithstanding the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in American Needle, favoring
NFLP,176 denied Defendant EA’s motion to dismiss the alleged
antitrust violations. The court observed that the series of
exclusive deals between EA and the NFL “killed off”
competition and “prevented [competitors] from reentering the
market.”177 Given the facts presented by the Plaintiff, there
existed enough plausible evidence to establish that the
Defendant had behaved illegally.178
Along with the manifested anticompetitive harms,
collective exclusive product category limitation is also not a
restraint ancillary to achieve any recognized procompetitive
benefits.179 The restrictions are unnecessary to achieve such
benefits as lowering transaction costs, lowering trademark
rights enforcement costs, or enhancing competitive balance
among league clubs.180 Rather than designating one exclusive
licensee, any procompetitive benefits sought by NFLP could
be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.181
Evidently, the effects of NFLP’s exclusivity provision, in
tandem with its collectivity provisions, pose serious
170. Ashley, supra note 159, at 2.
171. First Amended Complaint at 5, Pecover, 633 F.Supp.2d 976 (No. C 082820VRW), 2011 WL 2609621.
172. Pecover, 633 F.Supp.2d at 980.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Am. Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2008).
177. Pecover, 633 F.Supp. 2d at 983.
178. Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 592-95 (2007).
179. See infra Part III. for a detailed discussion on this point.
180. Mitten, supra note 23, at 924.
181. Id. at 930.
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anticompetitive harms. For these reasons, NFLP’s collective,
exclusive product category licensing should be deemed invalid
under a quick-look rule of reason.
III. RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS
In pressing its antitrust challenge, ANI must consider the
holding of NCAA, which held that per se rules of illegality are
inapplicable in the context of league sports.182 Rather, the
challenged restraint should be evaluated under the “flexible
Rule of Reason.”183 Accordingly, ANI’s inquiry focuses on
whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition
to the benefit of consumers and whether or not these
restraints are reasonably necessary to achieve such
efficiencies.184
In this regard, the Supreme Court has formulated the
following test:
[T]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint is imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained. . . .185

The Rule of Reason inquiry described in the preceding
quote can be divided into the following prongs: First, what
competitive harm results or is threatened by the
collaborators’ activities; second, what are the pro-competitive
“redeeming virtues” of the challenged collaboration; third,
does an “on balance” evaluation of the anticompetitive harms
and procompetitive virtues suggest that the restrictions are
reasonable; and fourth, are there less restrictive alternatives
– that is, is the restraint reasonably necessary for the
achievement of any such legitimate objectives?186
182. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101-03 (1984).
183. American Needle Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 2010 WL 2025207, at *12 (May
24, 2010).
184. Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis Of Sports League Contracts With Cable
Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463, 489 (1990) (There exists “a long-standing antitrust
tradition of exploring less restrictive alternatives before sanctioning agreements among
competitors . . . the antitrust laws must [] condemn agreements both harmful to
consumers and unnecessary to achieve efficiencies in production or distribution . . . .”).
185. Bd. of Trade of City of Chicago v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 244 (1918).
186. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1502 (3d ed.
2010).
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A. Competitive Harm that Results by Collaborators’ Activities
Under the first prong, ANI can specify the substantial
competitive harms that result from NFLP’s restrictions on
pricing and output. NFLP has forced each member team to
relinquish control over its own individual intellectual
property. Subject to the whim of NFLP, individual NFL
teams are thereby unable to set prices or control output of
their products.
1. Price
From the outset, ANI should note the anticompetitive
harms stemming from NFLP’s price restrictions. According to
U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum, a “combination formed for the
purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing,
pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate
or foreign commerce is illegal per se.”187 This is because price
is the “central nervous system of the economy.”188 Therefore,
an agreement that “interfere[s] with the setting of price by
free market forces” is illegal on its face.189
As mentioned, in the context of Major League Baseball,
each MLB club designates MLBP to set the price of the
competing clubs’ merchandise, with MLBP dividing all profits
generated from the sales equally among the clubs.190 In
Salvino, the plaintiff alleged that MLBP’s price provisions
constituted a horizontal agreement among competing entities
to “fix the compensation [MLB clubs] receive.”191 The
individual clubs have relinquished all control over the price of
their own products and now receive an equal amount of
revenue, “regardless of merit or individual contribution.”192
In her concurring opinion,193 Judge Sotomayor faults the
Majority for adopting an “overly formalistic view of price

187. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
188. Id. at 224 n. 59.
189. United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1968).
190. See Major League Baseball Props. Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 295 (2d
Cir. 2008).
191. Id. at 320.
192. Brief and Special Appendix for Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant at 7,
Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino Inc., 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 06-1867cv), 2006 WL 6174626.
193. Salvino, 542 F.3d at 334 (Sotamayor, J., concurring).
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fixing.”194 Through their reasoning, the Majority has failed to
address Salvino’s contention of price fixing by MLBP.195
Sotomayor held that, because the MLB clubs gave MLBP the
sole authority to set prices for the licenses of the individual
clubs, MLBP has “commandeered the rights of its
members.”196 In effect, MLBP has set the price for each Club’s
team-specific merchandise.197 Sotomayor analogized such
conduct to that of competitors creating a pre-textual “joint
venture,” to serve as the exclusive seller of their competing
products.198 Based upon the aforementioned opinions, MLBP’s
conduct constitutes a price-restriction by competing
entities.199
Similar to Salvino, NFL teams have adopted a revenuesharing agreement that eliminates price competition.200 The
league as a whole has designated NFLP to exclusively exploit
the intellectual property of all the teams.201 In exchange,
NFLP distributes the earned revenues equally among the
teams, regardless of the proportion of sales generated by the
intellectual property of each individual team.202 As was held
true by Salvino, such cooperative conduct by competing
entities in the NFL is the essence of “price-fixing.”203
2. Output
ANI should also note the significant anticompetitive
harms stemming from NFLP’s output restrictions. These
restrictions force each NFL owner to cede control over
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 326 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85,
106 n. 30 (1984)).
197. Id. at 336.
198. Id.
199. The mere agreement among competitors to exchange price information is a per
se price-fixing violation of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil,
310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
200. Amended Complaint, supra note 43, at ¶ 33.
201. Id.
202. If allowed to license their own intellectual property, more power teams, such as
the Dallas Cowboys, would set their own prices and receive revenues exceeding their
pro rata share of profits. See id.
203. Salvino, 542 F.3d at 335 (Sotamayor, J., concurring). (“[T]he effect of the
agreement clearly eliminates price competition between the Clubs for trademark
licenses. An agreement to eliminate price competition from the market is the essence of
price fixing.”).
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licensing of its products to NFLP.204 Because a relative
handful of clubs account for the bulk of revenues in any given
year, the arrangement stymies the clubs’ individual abilities
of production, and makes output unresponsive to consumer
preferences.205 As a “direct, actual, probable, and intended
result . . . [NFLP has denied] individual member clubs the
right freely to compete in the market.”206
Likewise, in Salvino, the plaintiff contended that MLBP’s
collectivity arrangements are naked output restrictions.207 In
designating MLBP as the central licensor, individual MLB
clubs have necessarily agreed to forgo their own output.208 The
agreement in Salvino is an “express agreement to reduce
output,”209 and reduces output “by its terms.”210
A majority of the Second Circuit panel, however, disagreed
that output is necessarily restricted. The Court held that, “a
mere refusal to grant a license to Salvino would not suffice to
support a claim of antitrust violation.”211 As a matter of fact,
“the Clubs’ agreement to make MLBP their exclusive licensor
does not by its express terms restrict or reduce the number of
licenses to be issued; it merely alters the identity of the
licenses’ issuer.”212 Other than Salvino, various licensees are
still able to license the clubs’ intellectual property through
MLBP. In fact, the record showed a sizeable increase in the
number of licensees for the intellectual property of MLBP;
with output growing from about 100 licensees in 1987 to over
300 licensees outstanding for some 4,000 products in the
United States, by 2005.213
Here, in contrast to Major League Baseball’s collectivity
arrangements, NFLP’s addition of an exclusivity agreement
with Reebok and Nike has absolutely lowered the licensee
base.
While with MLBP, multiple licensees could still
compete for the intellectual property rights of the clubs, here,
204. Amended Complaint, supra note 43, at ¶ 4.
205. Id.at ¶ 74.
206. Id.
207. Brief and Special Appendix for Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant, supra
note 192, at 6.
208. Id.
209. Major League Baseball Props. Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 318 (2d Cir.
2008).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 309.
213. Id. at 297-98.
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NFLP has designated only Reebok (now Nike and New Era) to
license the NFL teams’ intellectual property. Therefore,
NFLP’s arrangements have far greater anticompetitive harm
in reducing the marketable output.
B. Pro-Competitive “Redeeming Virtues” of the Challenged
Collaboration
In evaluating ANI’s antitrust challenge, Courts need to
consider redeeming pro-competitive virtues of NFLP’s
restraint. NFLP has advanced several arguments to suggest
that the pro-competitive benefits of its provisions outweigh
the anti-competitive harms. However, as will be explained,
NFLP’s arguments rely on faulty premises that likely defeat
an “on-balance” judgment of reasonableness.214
Similar to MLBP’s arguments in Salvino, NFLP has
justified its restrictions by relying heavily on Broadcast Music
Inc v. Columbia Broadcasting System.215 In Broadcast Music,
individual artists granted licensing organizations, including
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP) and Broadcast Music Inc (BMI), nonexclusive rights
to license their works.216 In turn, ASCAP and BMI granted
blanket licenses to licensees to perform all of the compositions
of member artists.217 The fees that licensees paid were usually
a percentage of licensees’ total revenues or a flat dollar
amount.218 Such fees were independent of the amount of music
actually used by licensees.219
The plaintiff, CBS alleged that the ASCAP and BMI
arrangements violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, because they
constituted “illegal price fixing.”220 Through its arrangement
with individual artists to create the blanket license, the
ASCAP and BMI have set the price for use of individual
artists’ works.221
The Supreme Court disagreed with CBS. The Court
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 186 at ¶ 1508.
Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 6.
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looked to the fact that a joint selling arrangement, such as the
one promoted by ASCAP and BMI, could be so efficient that it
would reap otherwise unattainable efficiencies and be procompetitive.222 In particular, in the composition market, there
existed “thousands of users, thousands of copyright owners,
and millions of compositions.”223 Given this fact, a central
licensing entity accomplished the goals of reducing
transaction costs, integrating sales, and improving
monitoring and enforcement against unauthorized copyright
use, all of which would present difficult and expensive
problems if left to individuals.224 The result is that “the whole
is truly greater than the sum of its parts,” creating in effect, a
different product.225
Similar to BMI, MLBP argued that its arrangements
allowed it to reap otherwise unattainable pro-competitive
efficiencies. Defendants argued that, through MLBP, the
Clubs have been able to (1) reduce transaction costs, (2)
integrate sales, (3) more effectively enforce and monitor its
intellectual property, and (4) improve quality control.226
MLBP’s arguments, which are essentially identical to those
presented by NFLP,227 will be discussed in the order they are
presented.
First, as a selling agent for the Clubs’ intellectual
property, MLBP allows more products to be licensed by
reducing transaction costs.228 Without MLBP, a potential
licensee must approach each Club separately to negotiate
licenses. The potential licensee may be unable to obtain
licenses from all the Clubs.229 The ability to offer a one-stop
shop for licenses thus reduces the amount of time and effort
222. Id. at 20.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 21.
226. See generally Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Claimant-Defendant-Appellee, Major
League Baseball Props. v. Salvino Inc., 542 F.3d. 290 (2006) (No. 06-1867-cv), 2006 WL
6174627.
227. Joint Appendix, American Needle v. Nat’l Football League, No. 08-661, 2009
WL 3006320 (Sept. 18, 2009).
228. The NFLP argued that it is able to reduce transaction costs by offering a onestop shop for the package of NFL license rights, without which licensing rights would
be prohibitively expensive for licensees to acquire on their own. Id. at 140.
229. For example, in one year, Houston Astros refused to license rights to Topps,
and that year, the Topps set of baseball cards did not include a single Astros team card.
Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Claimant-Defendant-Appellee, supra note 226, at 9.
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required to obtain rights to the intellectual property of the
MLB.230
Second, the Clubs have been able to integrate sales and
realize efficiencies in promotions, advertising and
marketing.231 MLBP has been able to employ companies to
provide marketing information, which it uses to develop
campaigns and product lines for the benefit of all Clubs.232
MLBP is also able to target and negotiate with national
retailers, something a single Club that offers products bearing
only its individual mark cannot do.233
Third, MLBP is able to achieve efficiencies in intellectual
property enforcement.234 Prior to the creation of MLBP, “there
was open-season on Club marks, unauthorized merchandise
was the marketplace norm, and the name ‘Major League
Baseball’ had little identity and no commercial value.”235
Since then, MLBP has obtained thousands of trademark
registrations and enforcements for MLB Club marks.236 MLBP
is able to identify from its own records and history whether a
particular product is licensed and if not, whether to exercise
enforcement measures.237
Fourth and final point, a centralized entity such as MLBP
can ensure that the MLB intellectual property is used
properly. In particular, the MLBP can assure that the
licensees’ use of the Clubs’ trade dress and logos are correct
and accurate, that the licensees have used the proper form,
that any copyright or trademark symbol is prominently
displayed, and that the product reflects the licensing
agreement.238 In line with quality control, a centralized
230. This is especially important for manufacturers of baseball cards, video games,
etc.
231. The NFLP argued that NFLP’s extensive marketing and promotion efforts and
relationship with major retailers benefit consumers and licensees. NFLP is able to offer
such market participants “centralized support” of the entire line of NFL-licensed goods.
Joint Appendix, supra note 227, at 140.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. The NFLP argued that NFLP is able to offer trademark registration and
enforcement. For example, NFLP manages a “worldwide trademark portfolio of over
8,000 registrations and applications.” The NFLP is able to provide clearance searches,
send “cease and desist” letters, initiate civil litigation, and handle trademark
prosecutions before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Id. at 142.
235. Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Claimant, supra note 226, at 7.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See id.
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licensor such as MLBP saves the licensees the need to obtain
quality control approvals from a myriad of separate and
conflicting quality control centers of the individual MLB
Clubs.239
1. Rebuttal to Pro-competitive Justifications
In evaluating ANI’s antitrust challenge, the anticompetitive harms of NFLP’s restrictions should be balanced
with its procompetitive benefits.240 This allows courts to reach
an “on balance” judgment about “reasonableness.”241 This
balance should be the guiding force in determining whether a
Sherman Act violation has occurred.
a. Difference in BMI versus NFLP
There are important differences in the NFLP provisions,
such as the exclusivity and revenue sharing obligations,
which make BMI an inapt precedent. First, in BMI, artists
had the ability to offer their licenses on a nonexclusive basis
to BMI or ASCAP, while retaining the unfettered ability to
license their products themselves.242 By contrast, the
provisions of NFLP (and also MLBP) mandate that individual
teams license their intellectual property to the central entities
on an exclusive basis.243 Therefore, individual teams within
the NFL actually lose the ability to license their own
intellectual property.
The Salvino court holds that this exclusivity aspect is
insignificant. The interests of each Club are interdependent
and it is this “interdependence and Major League Baseball’s
need for competitive balance among the Clubs [that]
distinguish the Clubs from the individual composers and
publishers of music who were the subject of Broadcast
Music . . . .”244
However, the complaints brought by Jones squarely rebut
239. Joint Appendix, supra note 225, at 144. (The NFLP argued that its quality
control department ensures that the NFL’s intellectual property is used in an
appropriate manner with licensed products and that licensed products “reflect the
branding goals associated with NFL football.”).
240. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 186, at ¶ 1507.
241. Id.
242. Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
243. Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 323 (2d Cir 2008).
244. Id. (emphasis added).
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the premise that individual teams’ interests are
interdependent.
Jones’s complaint suggests that the
intellectual property of the Cowboys is extremely valuable.245
In one fiscal year alone, more than 20% of the revenue
generated by NFLP from licensed products came from
products bearing Cowboys marks alone.246 Yet, the Cowboys
only received one-thirtieth of the distributed profits of
NFLP.247 Evidently, Jones is not dependent upon NFLP.
Rather, Jones must sacrifice his profits to subsidize less
successful teams in the NFL.
Second, in BMI, the agreement to designate ASCAP and
BMI as central licensors is premised on individual artists
receiving royalties proportional to the use of their
copyrights.248 Tying royalties received to frequency of use
provides individual artists with economic incentives to
promote their own products.
In contrast, the NFLP
provisions mandate that each member team receive an equal
distribution of revenues regardless of use or contribution of its
individual trademarks.249
Such provisions have the effect of reducing the overall
quality of NFL merchandise. Given the wide disparity in
contributions made by each individual team, distributing
revenues equally “adversely affect[s] the quality of goods
available.”250 In the absence of this agreement, success in the
sale of licensed merchandise would be tied to the competition
for fans as well as the ability to create and distribute more
desirable products. However, under NFLP’s revenue-sharing
policy, each team receives an equal share of revenues
generated from sales of intellectual property, regardless of
contribution. As a result, the teams have been deprived of the
economic incentive to effectively market and promote the
quality of their own brands.251
Such provisions also foster anti-competitiveness in the
form of a free rider problem. In economics, the free-rider
245. See Amended Complaint, supra note 43 at ¶ 4.
246. Id. at ¶ 40.
247. Id.
248. Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 5 (1979).
249. For example, the Yankees contribute the highest grossing revenue out of all
the MLB teams but receive the same revenue as the lowest grossing team. Complaint
Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief, supra note 49.
250. See id. at ¶ 13.
251. See id. at ¶ 41.
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problem refers to a situation where some individuals consume
more than their fair share of a public resource, or shoulder
less than a fair share of the costs of its production.252 An
example involves a club member who goes to all the club
events without ever contributing to the club’s annual fund
drive.253 The free rider problem frequently surfaces in the
context of NFLP’s licensing practices.254 Here, the fixed
income from the NFLP is derived from the efforts of the more
successful teams; thus, the lowest grossing team has less
incentive to invest in the success of its own brands.
Creating free riding among individual teams also
counteracts NFLP’s argument that if teams were allowed to
grant individual licenses, they would free-ride off of the
actions of the NFLP in promoting the league brand.255 In fact,
it is doubtful whether NFLP has actually promoted its
league’s brand and whether such a centralized effort is
superior to individualized efforts by the separate teams. In
Jones’s complaint, for instance, the plaintiff pointed to the
bloated administrative costs NFLP imposes upon its
members.256 In one fiscal year, for instance, NFLP spent 64%
of its gross revenues, generated from its own members, on
direct costs and administrative expenses alone.257 Such costs
are, “to all appearances, extraordinarily and wastefully
high.”258
Clear from Jones’s Complaints is the fact that less
successful teams are profiting off of the successes of other
teams. Each marks’ value and strength “vary widely,”259 and
the contribution by each club is widely disparate.260 As a
result, the NFLP as a “cartel, hinders efficiency by creating
the incentive for free-riding.”261 For these reasons, the NFLP
provisions are much more anticompetitive in light of the
252. Free Rider Problem, PRINCETON, http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/
wiki100k/docs/Free_rider_problem.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
253. The Free Rider, KENT STATE, http://www.personal.kent.edu/~cupton/
Lectures%20in%20Microeconomics/powerpointslides/Micro%20PDF/The%20Free%20Ri
der.pdf.
254. Amended Complaint, supra note 43.
255. Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Claimant, supra note 226.
256. Amended Complaint, supra note 43, at ¶ 4.
257. Id. at ¶ 39.
258. Id. at ¶ 38.
259. Id. at ¶ 40.
260. Id.
261. Id. at ¶ 47.
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Sherman Act.
b. Differences in MLBP vs NFLP
The anticompetitive harms stemming from NFLP’s
provisions also cut deeper than those of MLBP. Whereas
MLBP allows the existence of multiple licensees and ties
licensing costs to revenues, NFLP limits licensing to a single
licensee and segregates licensing costs from revenues.
First, in Salvino, although Plaintiff complained that
prospective licensees, including itself, “live at the whim and
caprice of MLB . . . [as MLBP] can arbitrarily exclude any
[licensee] it wishes,”262 the court disagreed and held that
antitrust claimants cannot show harm merely by “showing
that the plaintiff has been harmed as an individual
competitor.”263 In fact, MLBP actually increased the Clubs’
potential licensees base;264 boosting the number and variety of
MLB-licensed products that the Clubs would have achieved
through individual licensing.265
By contrast, in the context of NFLP, the harm is not just to
ANI as an “individual competitor,” but rather, on “competition
as a whole . . . .”266 Reason being, NFLP does not tolerate
multiple competing licensees, and only allows the existence of
a single licensee.267 Thus, individual licensees are, in fact,
subject to the arbitrary whim of NFLP. As gatekeeper to the
licensing market, NFLP can exclude, at any time, any licensee
other than the one designated.
Second, MLBP’s provisions require licensees to pay MLBP
a percentage of the profit they receive from the overall sale of
their MLB-branded products.268 By contrast, NFLP sells
licenses to licensees for a “sum certain.”269 The price for the
teams’ intellectual property is therefore independent of
ultimate sales of NFL-branded merchandise. Rudimentary
economics would suggest that because licensees pay the same
262. Brief and Special Appendix for Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant, supra
note 192, at 7.
263. Salvino, 542 F.3d at 308.
264. Brief for Plaintiff-Counter-Claimant, supra note 226.
265. Salvino, 542 F.3d at 308.
266. Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 44 (1997).
267. Mitten, supra note 23, at 927.
268. Salvino, 542 F.3d at 303.
269. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 118, n. 30 (1984).
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price for each individual teams’ branded merchandise
regardless of overall sales, NFLP’s provisions limit the
available consumer choices of retail products bearing the NFL
teams’ trademarks.270 Similar to NCAA,271 where each telecast
was sold for a uniform price, regardless of quality or
popularity, NFLP’s controls make the price paid for the
team’s intellectual property unresponsive to the relative
quality of the teams playing the games.272 Ultimately, NFLP’s
provisions result in a market that is unresponsive to
consumer demand.273
C. Less-Restrictive Alternatives
NFLP’s provisions as it stands, fail to be less restrictive
than necessary to achieve its purported procompetitive
efficiencies.274 Rather than be subject to the control and
supervision of NFLP, individual NFL teams should be allowed
to pursue merchandise development and innovation
independent of a central entity.
In their article,275 authors Stephen Ross and Stefan
Szymanski articulate that the traditional structure of clubrun leagues impose significant costs in a variety of markets
where sports leagues operate.276 With respect to NCAA, Ross
and Szymanski faulted the Supreme Court for assuming that
the presence of a member-run venture was an indispensable
part of the parties’ pro-competitive cooperation.277 In
particular, the Justices overlooked “the significant antitrust
risks from [sports leagues’] conscious decision to operate a
member-run venture . . . .”278
The crux of Ross and Szymanski’s argument is that club270. Mitten, supra note 23, at 928.
271. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 118.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1402 (1986). (“[I]f an agreement with any
significant potential to harm competition is justified by its potential for efficiency, then
the agreement must be tailored in such a fashion as to do the least harm possible to
competition without giving up the efficiency gains.”).
275. Stephen F. Ross & Stefan Szymanski, Antitrust and Inefficient Joint Ventures:
Why Sports Leagues Should Look More Like McDonald’s and Less Like The United
Nations, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 213 (2006).
276. See id. at 217.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 216.
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run leagues will necessarily make decisions about organizing
the league that limit the extent of economic competition.279 In
the licensing and merchandise context, economists suggest
that decision-making should be left to those who have the best
information.280 However, due to the fact that sports leagues
centralize all aspects of the marketing of team merchandise,
individual owners cannot pursue innovative ideas in order to
add revenue.281 Instead, the licensing is done centrally with
little or no participation from the individual teams.
Rather than the current set-up, vesting decision-making in
entities with the best knowledge would be most efficient and
responsive to consumer demand. As an example, in Jerry
Jones’ complaint against NFLP, Jones claimed that as a
franchise owner, he should be able to maximize his licensing
revenues instead of “settling” for his cut from the NFLP.282 An
owner who has invested millions in his own team has a far
greater incentive to aggressively market his team.283 One
would expect, therefore, that an efficient league would divide
the merchandising responsibility, and sell those parts of the
activities that the teams understands best, back to the
respective franchise.284
The model proposed by Jones is the model of the soccer
clubs in the English Premier League and the Spanish Liga
BBVA, whose operations are substantially similar.285 In these
soccer clubs, there is little cooperative licensing of
merchandise. Instead, each individual club has its own shops
and operations.286 Without the need to serve a centralized
entity, individual clubs could make independent decisions
resulting in arrangements that are more efficient and
profitable. Indeed, the most valuable sports franchises in the
world is the Spanish soccer team Real Madrid, with an
estimated value of $3.3 billion, followed closely by the soccer
279. Id.
280. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986).
281. Ross & Szymanski, supra note 275, at 215.
282. William J. Hoffman et. al., Dallas’ Head Cowboy Emerges Victorious in a
Licensing Showdown With the N.F.L.: National Football League Properties v. Dallas
Cowboys Football Club, 7 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 255, 283 (1997).
283. Id.
284. Ross & Szymanski, supra note 275, at 230.
285. Id.
286. Id. at n. 61.
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teams, F.C. Barcelona and Manchester United, F.C.287
1. Application of Ross & Szymanski’s Model to the NFL
Because the NFL teams remain separate business entities,
the idea inspired by Ross and Szymanski should be fully
transplanted to the context of the NFL. Within the 2001
exclusivity contract with Reebok, there exists a clause that
allows NFL owners to pursue new ideas for marketing or
sponsorship independently with an agreed-upon share of
proceeds going to the league.288 In particular, NFLP has
agreed to grant individual NFL owners the right to retain the
ability to become private wholesaler, retailer and distributor
of its own apparel.289 So long as a team reaches a certain
revenue threshold to be paid to the league, the team is
entitled to keep any excess revenue generated.290
Although the team’s ability to retain its own profits is a
move in the right direction, there still exist anticompetitive
harms rooted in revenue sharing schemes of NFLP. In
particular, the profit threshold teams must reach before being
able to retain their own revenues, remains prohibitively
high.291 Such threshold is determined by an average of the
individual team’s prior earnings, with above-average earnings
being extremely rare.292 For example, the Cowboy’s share of
NFL sales has been 16%, and so it must guarantee a
minimum of 16% to the league, retaining the excess, if any,
for itself.293 For teams that only generate 2% or 3%, the
minimal threshold is 5% and so the team must pay at least
5% to the league.294 Therefore, these teams would rather
settle for their “cut” from NFLP rather than pursue strategies
maximizing individual profits.
While the new adoptions are not fool proof, it is a good
287. Michael David Smith, Sharing the Wealth Has Made NFL Owners the Richest
in the World, NBC SPORTS (July 16, 2013), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/
07/16/sharing-the-wealth-has-made-nfl-owners-the-richest-in-the-world/.
288. Rick Gosselin, NFL Owners Vote to Allow Each Team to Market, Distribute
Own Reebok Apparel, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 24, 2001, available at
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-74994129.html.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Gosselin, supra note 288.
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start. The new marketing provisions allow teams to have
even greater control of their own brands. For example, based
on its ability to keep revenues from stadium sponsorships, the
Dallas Cowboys generated more than $80 million in
sponsorship from companies such as Ford Motor, Bank of
America, PepsiCo, Dr. Pepper and Miller Brewing, almost $20
million more than any other football team.295 Now, with the
innovation in merchandising independence, teams “can decide
what color and design [they] want. . .decide how many hats
[they] want sold. . .[and] decide if there’s one hat made and
sold or 100,000 hats.”296 Given this potential for individual
development, there is no reason why individual teams should
not retain greater control over its own intellectual property at
the expense of the outmoded central entity.
CONCLUSION
After an analysis of the myriad of possibilities on remand,
it is apparent that the current NFLP provisions pose serious
harms. First, the merchandising of professional football
products constitutes a unique market. Second, under a quicklook inquiry, the NFLP provisions are naked restraints on
price and output without ancillary benefits. Finally, from the
standpoint of the rule of reason, the substantial
anticompetitive effects outweigh the minimal procompetitive
benefits, and less restrictive alternatives exist for fostering
greater procompetitive benefits. For the reasons articulated,
NFLP’s provisions should be adjudged illegal under the
Sherman Act.

295. Mike Ozanian, Dallas Cowboys Lead NFL With $2.1 Billion Valuation, FORBES
(Sept. 5, 2012, 8:31 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2012/09/05/dallascowboys-lead-nfl-with-2-1-billion-valuation/.
296. Id.

